

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 080973

FOL RPT USUN 00901 ACTION SECSTATE INFO BONN GABORONE LAGOS
LONDON LUSAKA MAPUTO OTTAWA PARIS PRETORIA CAPE TOWN 14 MAR 78
QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 00901

FOR EMBASSY CAPE TOWN

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PORG, SF, WA
SUBJECT: NAMIBIA: DRAFT MESSAGE TO FRONTLINE STATES,
NIGERIA, AND GABON

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT WESTERN FIVE MESSAGE,
AGREED UPON BY CONTACT GROUP AD REFERENDUM MARCH 13
(SEPTEL), TO GOVERNMENTS OF FRONTLINE STATES,
NIGERIA, AND GABON.

1. ON 3 FEBRUARY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF OUR FIVE
GOVERNMENTS PROVIDED YOUR GOVERNMENT WITH A COPY OF
A PROPOSAL OF OURS FOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE NAMIBIAN
QUESTION CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
385. WE MUCH APPRECIATED THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND
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ADVICE WHICH YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER/YOUR REPRESENTATIVE
GAVE TO OUR FOREIGN MINISTERS DURING THE MEETINGS
WHICH THEY HELD WITH YOU AND WITH THE PARTIES IN
NEW YORK ON 11-12 FEBRUARY.

2. AT THOSE MEETINGS, AND IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION
SINCE THEN, BOTH SWAPO AND SOUTH AFRICA RAISED A
NUMBER OF POINTS ABOUT OUR PROPOSAL. SOME WERE
MATTERS OF DRAFTING; OTHERS WERE MORE
SUBSTANTIVE. OUR FIVE GOVERNMENTS HAVE CAREFULLY

CONSIDERED EVERY POINT THAT WAS RAISED, AND HAVE MADE SOME AMENDMENTS TO CLARIFY THE TEXT. THE MAIN BODY OF THE TEXT, HOWEVER, REMAINS UNALTERED. WE HAVE NOW INSTRUCTED OUR REPRESENTATIVES TO PROVIDE YOU WITH OUR REVISED PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA LEADING TO EARLY MAJORITY RULE AND INDEPENDENCE FOR THE TERRITORY. WE SHALL BE SENDING THE PROPOSAL VERY SHORTLY TO THE PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED. IT HAS THE UNRESERVED BACKING OF OUR FIVE GOVERNMENTS, AND WE BELIEVE THAT IT CAN BRING ABOUT A RAPID AND PEACEFUL END TO THIS LONG-STANDING DISPUTE. WE HOPE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL SUPPORT IT, AND THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL ACT UPON IT.

3. IT MAY BE HELPFUL IF WE EXPLAIN THE THINKING BEHIND OUR PROPOSAL. WE BELIEVE IT IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH RESOLUTION 385, WHILE OF NECESSITY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES INVOLVED IN THE DECOLONISATION OF NAMIBIA. SO FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, SOUTH AFRICA'S PRESENCE IN NAMIBIA IS ILLEGAL AND SHOULD BE ENDED. AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE TO RECOGNISE THE FACTS OF LIFE; CONFIDENTIAL

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SOUTH AFRICA CONTROLS NAMIBIA, AND HAS DONE SO FOR SIXTY YEARS. MOREOVER, EVEN IF SOUTH AFRICA WERE NOW WILLING TO WITHDRAW UNCONDITIONALLY, THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD NOT HAVE THE RESOURCES TO ADMINISTER THE TERRITORY. WE HAVE CHOSEN THE PATH OF NEGOTIATION, AND WE CANNOT NEGOTIATE SOUTH AFRICA'S UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER.

4. WHAT WE HAVE ACHIEVED, HOWEVER, IS AGREEMENT UPON VERY SUBSTANTIAL UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WILL HAVE A DECISIVE INFLUENCE OVER THE POLITICAL PROCESS, AND HIS CIVILIAN AND MILITARY STAFF WILL BE CONSIDERABLE IN SIZE. WHILE WE HAVE LEFT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO DECIDE WHAT IS NECESSARY, GIVEN THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE TASK, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THIS OPERATION WILL BE THE LARGEST THAT THE UNITED NATIONS HAS MOUNTED FOR MANY YEARS. ALL LEVELS OF THE ADMINISTRATION, THE POLICE, AND THE SMALL RESIDUAL SOUTH AFRICAN FORCE, WILL COME UNDER THE CLOSE SUPERVISION OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE'S STAFF. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS COULD DELIBERATELY VIOLATE THE AGREEMENT WITHOUT BRINGING DOWN UPON THEMSELVES THE CONDEMNATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. ONCE A UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE HAS BEEN INSTALLED IN NAMIBIA, LIFE IN THAT TERRITORY

CAN NEVER BE THE SAME AGAIN. WE SHALL HAVE BROUGHT ABOUT A BREAK WITH THE DISCRIMINATION OF THE PAST, AND PAVED THE WAY, WE HOPE, FOR A PEACEFUL AND DEMOCRATIC FUTURE.

5. YOU WILL KNOW THAT FOUR MAIN AREAS OF DISAGREE-

MENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES REMAINED AFTER THE NEW YORK
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TALKS. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL, REPRESENTING THE DE FACTO ADMINISTRATION OF NAMIBIA, WILL CLEARLY BE OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE. WE ARE ANXIOUS TO AVOID RESURRECTING THE LEPAL DISPUTES AS TO WHO HAS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OVER NAMIBIA THAT HAVE SO LONG BEDEVILLED CONSIDERATION OF THIS QUESTION. WE SEE THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AS HAVING TWO MAIN ROLES. HE WILL BE THE WATCHDOG OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AND THE GUARANTOR THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT WILL BE RESPECTED BY SOUTH AFRICA AND BY ALL PARTIES. NO PROPOSAL AFFECTING THE POLITICAL PROCESS CAN BE IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT HIS AGREEMENT. WE HOPE, HOWEVER, THAT HE WILL ALSO BUILD UP A WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL, SO THAT, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, DISPUTES BETWEEN THE TWO OFFICIALS CAN BE SETTLED PRIVATELY AND INFORMALLY. WHILE THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE UNITED NATIONS MUST REMAIN VIGILANT TO ENSURE THAT THE AGREEMENT IS RESPECTED, WE BELIEVE THAT THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD BE LEFT TO GET ON WITH HIS JOB, USING THE BROAD TERMS OF REFERENCE WITH WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL ENTRUSTS HIM.

6. THE PROPOSAL THAT OUR FIVE GOVERNMENTS MAKE FOR THE RETENTION OF A RESIDUAL SOUTH AFRICAN FORCE OF 1500 IN NAMIBIA UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS WILL NOT BE NEW TO YOU, AND WE HAVE LEFT THIS CRUCIAL SECTION OF OUR PROPOSAL UNALTERED. WE DO NOT SEE HOW SUCH A SMALL FORCE, CONFINED TO BASE AND CLOSELY MONITORED BY UNITED NATIONS MILITARY PERSONNEL, CAN POSSIBLY REPRESENT A THREAT TO THE FREEDOM OF THE
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ELECTION PROCESS. WHILE WE THINK IT NECESSARY TO MAKE THIS GESTURE TO SOUTH AFRICA, IT IS ALSO THE CASE THAT SOUTH AFRICA'S PRESENT MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN NAMIBIA IS CERTAINLY OVER 20,000, AND ACCORDING TO SWAPO MAY BE AS HIGH AS 50,000. WE CANNOT

ACCEPT SWAPO'S PROPOSAL THAT THE RESIDUAL FORCE SHOULD BE CONFINED TO BASE AT KARASBURG. THIS IS TANTA-MOUNT TO DEMANDING ITS COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL, AND WOULD BE BOTH HUMILIATING AND UNNECESSARY, GIVEN THE MONITORING ARRANGEMENTS THAT WE PROPOSE. WE DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THAT SECTION OF OUR PROPOSAL WHICH DEALTS WITH THE POLICE, WHERE WE HAVE TRIED TO MEET SWAPO'S LEGITIMATE CONCERNS ABOUT THEIR CONDUCT, AND ABOUT THE NEED TO MONITOR THEIR ACTIVITIES CAREFULLY.

7. AS REGARDS THE SIZE OF THE UN MILITARY CONTINGENT, WE REMAIN OF THE VIEW THAT WE SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE AN ARBITRARY FIGURE, BUT SHOULD LEAVE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO DETERMINE WHAT IS NECESSARY, IN THE LIGHT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE TASK. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, MADE IT CLEAR THAT OUR FIVE GOVERNMENTS WILL SUPPORT HIS JUDGEMENT, AND WE SHALL HONOR THIS COMMITMENT.

8. LASTLY, WE HAVE OMITTED FROM THE PROPOSAL THE DIFFICULT QUESTION OF WALVIS BAY. BOTH SIDES OBJECTED TO OUR EARLIER FORMULA, AND FOR DIFFERENT REASONS THOUGHT THAT IT SHOULD BE DROPPED. WE SEE NO WAY OF SETTLING THE QUESTION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, TOLD THE SOUTH AFRICANS THAT ALL ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION OF WALVIS BAY SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT OF NAMIBIA. OUR REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO MAKE THIS CLEAR IN THE SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL

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COUNCIL. WE HAVE OBTAINED ASSURANCES THAT THE STRENGTH OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORCE IN WALVIS BAY WILL NOT BE INCREASED DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, AND THAT NAMIBIANS IN WALVIS BAY WILL BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THE TERRITORY DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, INCLUDING VOTING IN THE ELECTIONS.

9. SOME OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR PROPOSAL HAVE CAUSED DIFFICULTY FOR ONE OR OTHER PARTY. IN OUR VIEW, HOWEVER, THEY ARE ALL COMPARATIVELY MINOR MATTERS WHICH MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO OBSTRUCT OUR GOAL OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

10. TURNING TO THE FUTURE, WE BELIEVE THAT WE MUST NOW PROCEED URGENTLY. WE WANT TO AVOID AN "INTERNAL SETTLEMENT" IN NAMIBIA, WITH ALL THE REPERCUSSIONS FOR PEACE IN THE AREA THAT COULD FOLLOW. MOREOVER, THE FORTHCOMING SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL

ASSEMBLY COULD WELL COMPLICATE OUR NEGOTIATIONS IN THE ABSENCE OF PROGRESS BETWEEN NOW AND THEN. WE HAVE ALREADY SEEN IN RHODESIA HOW INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS, AND RELUCTANCE TO NEGOTIATE, CAN COMPLICATE OUR EFFORTS. DELAY IN PURSUING OUR PROPOSAL FOR NAMIBIA WILL END ALL HOPES OF AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT THERE. SUCCESS, ON THE OTHER HAND, COULD HAVE REPERCUSSIONS ELSEWHERE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

11. WE THEREFORE HOPE THAT YOU WILL USE YOUR CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE WITH SWAPO TO PERSUADE THEM THAT NOW IS THE TIME FOR THEM TO WEIGH UP THEIR
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INTERESTS, AND TO AGREE TO OUR PROPOSAL BOTH AS CONSISTENT WITH RESOLUTION 385, AND AS OFFERING THEM A FAIR CHANCE IN DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS. WE RECOGNISE, OF COURSE, THAT ONLY SWAPO CAN DECIDE WHERE THEIR BEST INTERESTS LIE; BUT WE HOPE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL LEAVE THEM IN NO DOUBT AS TO YOUR OWN VIEW. IN ANY CASE, WE ALL HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROMOTING PEACEFUL CHANGE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WHICH CANNOT BE SUBJECT TO ANY ONE PARTY'S INTERESTS.

11A. (FOR ZAMBIA AND ANGOLA ONLY). WE SHOULD LIKE TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF OUR PROPOSAL. THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE CONCERNED THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR MILITARY FROM NAMIBIA WILL PAVE THE WAY FOR INCURSIONS BY SWAPO FROM NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES. WE HAVE TOLD THEM THAT WE THINK THEIR FEARS ARE UNFOUNDED AND THAT IN ANY CASE THE UNITED NATIONS WILL BE THERE TO SEE THAT NO SUCH INCURSIONS TAKE PLACE. WE ACCEPT, HOWEVER, THAT THE NORTHERN BORDER IS LONG AND HARD TO SUPERVISE EFFECTIVELY, AND WE THEREFORE HOPE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE STEPS, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OR HIS NOMINEES, TO ENSURE THAT NO MILITARY ACTIVITIES LIKELY TO DISTURB THE SETTLEMENT TAKE PLACE ON YOUR SIDE OF THE COMMON BORDER.

12. WE HAVE NOT DESCRIBED OUR PROPOSAL AS "FINAL" BECAUSE NEGOTIATORS CAN SELDOM BE SO CATEGORIC. WE WOULD, HOWEVER, ONLY BE PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE AMENDMENTS IF WE THOUGHT THEY MIGHT BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN SUCCESS AND FAILURE. WE KNOW THAT OUR PROPOSAL IS UNLIKELY TO BE FULLY ACCEPTABLE EITHER TO SWAPO OR TO SOUTH AFRICA. WE HAVE NARROWED THEIR DIFFERENCES AS FAR AS WE CAN, AND AFTER TAKING EACH
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TO OUR EARLIER FORMULA, AND FOR DIFFERENT REASONS THOUGHT THAT IT SHOULD BE DROPPED. WE SEE NO WAY OF SETTLING THE QUESTION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, TOLD THE SOUTH AFRICANS THAT ALL ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION OF WALVIS BAY SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT OF NAMIBIA. OUR REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO MAKE THIS CLEAR IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WE HAVE OBTAINED ASSURANCES THAT THE STRENGTH OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORCE IN WALVIS BAY WILL NOT BE INCREASED DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, AND THAT NAMIBIANS IN WALVIS BAY WILL BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THE TERRITORY DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, INCLUDING VOTING IN THE ELECTIONS.

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10. TURNING TO THE FUTURE, WE BELIEVE THAT WE MUST NOW PROCEED URGENTLY. WE WANT TO AVOID AN "INTERNAL SETTLEMENT" IN NAMIBIA, WITH ALL THE REPERCUSSIONS FOR PEACE IN THE AREA THAT COULD FOLLOW. MOREOVER, THE FORTHCOMING SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY COULD WELL COMPLICATE OUR NEGOTIATIONS IN THE ABSENCE OF PROGRESS BETWEEN NOW AND THEN. WE HAVE ALREADY SEEN IN RHODESIA HOW INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS, AND RELUCTANCE TO NEGOTIATE, CAN COMPLICATE OUR EFFORTS. DELAY IN PURSUING OUR PROPOSAL FOR
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11. WE THEREFORE HOPE THAT YOU WILL USE YOUR CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE WITH SWAPO TO PERSUADE THEM THAT NOW IS THE TIME FOR THEM TO WEIGH UP THEIR INTERESTS, AND TO AGREE TO OUR PROPOSAL BOTH AS CONSISTENT WITH RESOLUTION 385, AND AS OFFERING THEM A FAIR CHANCE IN DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS. WE RECOGNISE, OF COURSE, THAT ONLY SWAPO CAN DECIDE WHERE THEIR BEST INTERESTS LIE; BUT WE HOPE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL LEAVE THEM IN NO DOUBT AS TO YOUR OWN VIEW. IN ANY CASE, WE ALL HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROMOTING PEACEFUL CHANGE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WHICH CANNOT BE SUBJECT TO ANY ONE PARTY'S INTERESTS.

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HOPE THAT YOU WILL FEEL ABLE TO GIVE US YOUR SUPPORT
BOTH NOW, AS WE APPROACH THE MOMENT OF
DECISION, AND SUBSEQUENTLY DURING THE TRANSITIONAL
PERIOD, WHERE COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS
AND YOURS COULD WEEL BE DECISIVE IN SEEING TO IT
THAT THE AGREEMENT IS FAITHFULLY IMPLEMENTED BY
ALL PARTIES SO THAT NAMIBIA CAN MOVE TO A PEACEFUL
AND EARLY INDEPENDENCE. YOUNG
UNQUOTE COOPER
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 09 STATE 080973

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 26 sep 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, PROPOSALS (BID)
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 29 mar 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE080973
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: IO/UNP:TNILES:EK
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: D780137-0521
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
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Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t197803126/baaafcgh.tel
Line Count: 615
Litigation Code IDs:
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Litigation History:
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Message ID: 906e5ebb-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN IO
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 12
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 18 apr 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3167351
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NAMIBIA: DRAFT MESSAGE TO FRONTLINE STATES, NIGERIA, AND GABON
TAGS: PORG, PDEV, SF, WA, US, UK, CA, GE, FR
To: n/a INFO LIBREVILLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/906e5ebb-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014